Archive for Anglican

Granville Gibson Report


Report on the Diocese of Durham handling of the cases of former Rev Granville Gibson

This report was published on 17th December 2020 following the conviction of Granville Gibson for two charges of indecent assault in 2016 and again of two charges of indecent assault in 2019.

Dr Stephanie Hill prepared a report looking into the handling of allegations against Archdeacon Granville Gibson. She has produced a thoughtful and detailed report. It is a story of missed opportunities to prevent abuse, poor record keeping and failures to call out inappropriate behaviour.

Ms Hill was given access to documentation from the Diocesan records and has spoken to a number of complainants and witnesses who had contact with Granville Gibson throughout the 1980s to the 2000s.

Ms Hill spoke in particular to three survivors of abuse.

Survivor 1 states Mr Gibson sexually abused him between 1977 and 1985, the period when Mr Gibson officiated at St Clare’s. Mr Gibson allegedly touched the victim’s groin and would kiss and cuddle him, threatening him not to tell. The victim felt as if nobody would believe him and it was only after his father died in 2003 that he thought he should tell someone.

Survivor 2 recalled a troubled early life and being sentenced to Community Service, he thought around the age of 18, which he served at St Clare’s Church in Newton Aycliffe. Survivor 2 also described repeated sexual assaults by Mr Gibson, estimating around 15 in total over a three to four month period. These assaults allegedly occurred in both the church itself and Mr Gibson’s home (specifically in his study). They involved penetrative acts, which would now be called rape but was then termed buggery.

Survivor 3 was a young man in his twenties when he was ordained, with his first placement at St Clare’s Church in Newton Aycliffe around 1981. Within six months, Survivor 3 was approached by a female parishioner who had allegedly seen Mr Gibson kissing a young male Vietnamese man who had arrived in the area and was seeking support. Survivor 3 was clearly perturbed by this and unsure what to do. He described being cautioned by another priest who warned him not to pass on these concerns about Mr Gibson as he would be, ‘hung out to dry.’ Not long afterwards, Survivor 3 described being indecently assaulted by Mr Gibson who wrapped his body around Survivor 3, pressing his erect penis into him. Survivor 3 described shock and confusion and pushed Mr Gibson away who acted as if nothing had happened.

Survivor 3 took the step of asking to see the then Bishop of Durham, the Rt. Revd John Habgood. Survivor 3 found the Bishop’s response lacklustre, although Bishop Habgood did apparently state he would speak to Mr Gibson, which he later told Survivor 3 he had done. It is of particular concern there is no record of any conversations between Survivor 3 and the then Rt. Revd Bishop Habgood.

Following the implementation of the Data Protection Act (1998), an order was received to edit clergy files to remove hand-written entries made by Bishops or Archdeacons describing their personal comments about individual priests’ suitability for candidacy selection or training. There was also encouragement to reduce the overall bulk of blue files which were thought to hold extraneous material such as routine letters.

Granville Gibson was not a person within the Diocese who could be described as a demure character. Ms Hill was told by a number of clergy that prior to 2001 there were rumours and hearsay regarding Granville Gibson’s sexuality and behaviour particularly at social gatherings. He had a reputation for inappropriate behaviour towards younger male curates alongside excessive alcohol consumption. Invasion of personal space and excessive hugs were mentioned. If any concerns were set down on paper they have not survived editing of his file.

An incident from 2001 was recorded in 2004 on his file of him hugging and stroking the foot of a younger male priest. It had been reported to another priest.

Around this time it was noted that he had been advised he must not mingle with children during a trip to Romania.

Another priest recalls a concern about Granville Gibson’s interaction with an asylum seeker in Darlington. A further priest had mentioned he had seen Granville Gibson touching the asylum seeker in the vestry and that this young man had not been seen since. The same priest reported Granville Gibson had acted inappropriately with boys during the trip to Romania, sitting them ion his knee. This information was not passed to the Diocesan Safeguarding adviser.

In 2004 an allegation was received that Granville Gibson had sexually assaulted a 10 year old in 1982 whilst he was vicar at Newton Aycliffe. This was reported to the police and the Diocesan Safeguarding Adviser. The complainant did not wish to pursue criminal proceedings. The police took no action. Minutes of a meeting to discuss the allegation are not available due to storage issues. No risk assessment was carried out. There is no record of this on his blue (personnel) file.

The 2008 Past Cases Review carried out nationally recorded Granville Gibson as having no concerns. This was clearly erroneous given all that was known about him.

In 2009 Granville Gibson completed a self declaration form recording he had an allegation made against him around 1980 by a youth from the Newton Aycliffe detention centre, stating the DP said there was no case to answer. No action was taken on this which was a further red flag missed by the safeguarding system in the Diocese.

In 2012 a complaint was made by a young curate that Granville Gibson was overstepping boundaries with young servers at his church, taking them out for meals and accidental touching of another curate’s bottom. Granville Gibson was interviewed by the DSA and was required to do more training.

In 2014 Granville Gibson invited a pupil from a school where he was mentoring back to his house for tea. This contravened church and school policies. Granville Gibson was using a school issue laptop and pictures of naked men and homosexuality were discovered. This was referred to the police who opened an investigation. He was arrested and subsequently charged and convicted of indecent assaults.

Failures to record and therefore consider Mr Gibson’s behaviour altogether led
to what must now be seen as erroneous decisions to promote and propose him
for other socially responsible roles including involvement with many church organisations and even a school – St Aidan’s Academy.

Earlier action may have resulted in investigation and action to prevent his contact with others via a position with the church. It may have led to earlier arrest and conviction.

The report author mentions church culture as having a role to play in the mistakes made, some of them being:-

  • confusion over the boundary between safeguarding concerns and homosexuality,
  • forgiveness and repentance as central themes of church life,
  • parochialism in church parishes causing a reluctance of individuals to call out inappropriate behaviour,
  • Deference to clergy by parishioners and the public,
  • the fact that society in general still doesn’t recognise the scale of harm done by child sexual abuse,
  • there being little sense in the Diocese of responsibility for safeguarding and
  • a desire to extract material from files in 1998 and 2008.

Ms Hill commends the Diocese for its positive responses following Granville Gibson’s arrest and being open after 2015. She is positive about the independent nature of the Diocesan Safeguarding Adviser being self employed and so having an element of independence.

Ms Hill recommends :-

  • Improvements to recording, requiring meticulous and contemporary recording of incidents.
  • Joined up record keeping between all Diocesan systems
  • Repeats of Disclosure and Barring Checks (criminal records) and thorough investigations of any concerns newly raised
  • A focus on the immediate needs of victims
  • A more open culture of sharing concerns
  • A review of bullying and whistle blowing procedures

The report is published here


David Greenwood

17th December 2020

IICSA Anglican 2nd – 12th July 2019 Closing statement Switalskis

IICSA Anglican Inquiry

Wider Church Investigation

Closing on behalf of MACSAS and AN-A1 to A6, Phil Johnson, Julie MacFarlane, Graham Sawyer and Rev Matthew Ineson



Chair, panel: we act for ten victims of Anglican clerical sexual abuse and the survivors’ support group MACSAS.

Welby’s apology

  1. May I deal with one matter immediately. Yesterday, the Archbishop of Canterbury flourished a letter he says he wrote to Mr Inneson in 2017. That letter was disclosed to the Inquiry yesterday and then, to us, shortly before you came in at 2 pm. Mr Inneson has not had a chance to respond to it. The Archbishop relied on the final paragraph of that letter to suggest he had given Mr Inneson an apology. Mr Inneson does not accept that. His objection is to the words ‘deeply sorry….from your description of how this has been dealt with by the Church’. I am not sure it is even grammatical. It is certainly mealy mouthed. It does not frankly accept the Church treated him badly.
  2. Yesterday was an opportunity for the Archbishop to give a full apology – in public and in Mr Inneson’s presence – for what the Archbishop accepted was the ‘shabby and shambolic’ way Mr Inneson was treated by the Church. He sat there, the most powerful man in the Church, and Mr Inneson, sat behind, waited and waited and waited – as he has been for years. That was more than just a discourtesy to Mr Inneson. The Archbishop still ‘doesn’t get it’.A national, independent regulator
  3. I turn to the main body of my submissions.
  4. The Anglican Church is the first of the major institutions to face a final reckoning in this Inquiry. The Anglican Investigation, with all its component parts, is a case study par excellence for why there must be:
  5. a national, state-sponsored, independent, regulator of the child-care sector;
  6. a corporate structure for those who want to care for children.
  7. It is why I wish in this address to:
  8. suggest, tentatively, the beginnings of a more general theory of institutional abuse, to help answer the question: Which institutions pose the greatest risk to children?
  9. Explain why, if the theory is correct, there is a need for a national, state-sponsored, independent regulator of the child-care sector.
  10. This is not to replace the Church’s own steps to regulate itself. It is on top of that. Our essential point is: we do not care about the peculiarities of your byzantine institution comprised of 42 medieval fiefdoms, governed by centuries old Canon Law. You fix that if you can. It is your responsibility in every parish and every diocese. But you will comply with minimum standards set by a national regulator that apply to every registered institution that cares for children. No special pleading.
  11. What must not happen – and what we say would be a fools’ errand for you – is to attempt to make specific recommendations for each of the immensely complicated organisations you have to consider. Extensive though this inquiry is, you are still only considering a few institutions. What about all those institutions you will not be able to scrutinize?
  12. The regulator must be completely independent and, just as importantly, be seen to be independent.
  13. We first suggested a national, independent, regulator of the child-care sector at the conclusion of the Downside/Ampleforth case study in December 2017. At the time, it seemed a bold submission. It no longer seems a recommendation of the best, but one of absolute necessity.
  14. Others were content to limit their recommendation to mandatory reporting. The evidence has moved on. Even the Archbishops of Canterbury and York now accept mandatory reporting is a ‘no-brainer’.
  15. No change
  16. I will not, with great respect to the Survivors of clerical abuse – particularly those who have given evidence before you, some without anonymity – be dwelling on the litany of abuse, failed safeguarding and cover-up that you identified in your report into Chichester and Peter Ball and have heard yet more in this strand. All I will say, is that the evidence confirms that, despite the Church being anxious to be on best-behaviour in front of this Inquiry, the problems persist:
  17. An Archbishop of York who tells you that the ‘Voices of the abused must be heard” but takes advantage of a 1 year limitation period under the CDM against Mr Ineson.
  18. The same Archbishop who, only a few weeks ago, ordained his wife without, exceptionally, the very training he says is so badly needed. At the very least, he did not stop to think how this might be perceived as an abuse of power.
  19. A priest, AN-X7, who refused to accept it was wrong in principle for a convicted child-abuser to be on the parochial church council.
  20. And how the Church and its principal insurer EIG act together to deny pastoral support to victims and, before this Inquiry, refuse to disclose the privileged material that would reveal if they are telling the truth about it. And this is the insurer who is widely regarded as the most benevolent of the insurers claimants face in litigation.
  21. You have heard the same defensive narrative we have heard elsewhere:
    1. We did not know;
    2. We forgot we were told;
    3. I was only cc’d to the correspondence;
    4. If we were told, we could not believe it;
    5. We need more training and policies;
    6. The past is a foreign country. You are judging the past by the standards of today.
    7. Give us time.

22. They did know. They were told. They did believe it. They had training and policies galore. Child abuse is and always has been regarded as a grave crime. They have had so much time.

23. You will recall in the Downside inquiry how in 1972 the headmaster of Downside did what he was supposed to do with great alacrity when he discovered abuse: sacked the priest, informed the statutory authority and recommended defrocking to the Holy See.

24. And we heard from the older cleric Rev Christopher Watkins and how he dealt with a safeguarding problem in his Welsh parish perfectly correctly with limited training and resources.

25. The past is not a foreign country. Progress is not always linear. Institutions, like Empires, decline and fall.

26. The real risk is that once the heat of this Inquiry dies, the institution – whether it be the Anglican Church or the Catholic Church – revert to type or progress so slowly we have to wait a generation. It will not be sufficient to pass one or two laws that require mandatory reporting or extend position of trust offences. Laws ossify. Only look at Canon Law. You need a regulator that is continually applying the heat with guidance that changes dynamically as we better understand through experience what works and what doesn’t.

Which institutions pose the greatest risk to children?

27. I said I would to try to identify more general factors that identify high risk institutions.

These are:

28. Large institutions;

  • Large institutions cannot change their culture and practice quickly.
  • The Church has a presence in virtually every locality in the country from small hamlets to the major cities.
  • But it is also international. Archbishop Welby was at pains to explain in his statement that the Anglican Communion extends from the hill tribes in Papua New Guinea to New York City. And that the average congregant is ‘a woman in her 30s who lives on less than $4 a day…in an area of conflict’. The Church has to please everyone. And in doing so it pleases no one.
  • We heard how it took 5 years for the Church to consider the Seal of the Confessional only to decide to do nothing – despite some of its most senior members like the Archbishop of York agreeing that an absolute Seal was unjustifiable.
  • Bishop Sowerby was keen to emphasise that the new generation of ordinands were ‘open to safeguarding and all that it contains’. As if we should accept that cultural change may take a generation.

29. Powerful institutions

  • Powerful institutions can shelter and protect themselves by friends in high places. We heard how that worked in the Peter Ball investigation.

30. Institutions that organise themselves in a diffuse, Loose way, with a high degree of autonomy at the local level;

  • The life of a priest in the parish and the Bishop in the Diocese is largely his own to organise: unsupervised, unshackled, unregulated.

31. Where there is a powerful Ethos that binds members to each other and inhibits external scrutiny.

32. How does such a large, loosely supervised organisation maintain its organisation? By a powerful ethos supported by doctrine that binds members together. You expressed surprise that an organisation with an explicit moral purpose could do such wrong. In fact, it is no surprise. The express moral purpose becomes a cover [ACE0267757]. People defer to ‘good’ people.

33. The institution is dependent on a “clean” reputation and in which members know each other and live in the same communities the imperative to hide dirty linen is strong. This is true for most organisations looking after children. Reputations are strongly defended. A tarnished reputation is an existential threat. Only outside regulators can bring objectivity.

34. Where that Ethos is not consonant with accepted standards of child safeguarding. For example:

  • the absolute Seal of the Confessional is not consonant with accepted standards of child safeguardings.
  • Concept of forgiveness and its misguided consequences when perpetrators are forgiven and allowed to continue to pose a risk to children, e.g. Bishop Forster and the child pornography case.

35. Led by those who are ultimately only accountable to themselves.

  • Still, the Bishop is the ultimate decision-maker on child safety discipline. I think I am right in saying that all external commentators on the Church called for an end to the ‘Church marking its own homework’.

36. Who have ample access to children.

  • We know the Church is the largest provider of voluntary services to children after the State.

37. We suggest this analysis assists you in understanding why:

38. The Anglican Church is a high-risk institution. The Anglican Church, is unlikely to be effective in regulating itself to protect children.

39. If you consider the response by the Church in Wales, it has performed better and moved more swiftly. It is smaller. Safeguarding and discipline is more centrally organised. It is less powerful: it is not established, it is disestablished.

40. You have published your report about Chichester and Peter Ball in May. You identified key features of the Anglican Church that led to those terrible cases:

  • The prioritisation of reputation over the protection of children;
  • Deep-seated arrogance;
  • Clericalism and tribalism.
  • In the course of this hearing, you have looked in more detail at specific issues such as:
  • Church structures;
  • Disciplinary processes;
  • Cultural change.
  •  We would add:
  • The size of the Anglican Church.
  • Its established position at the heart of our constitution.

41. All of those things have played their part and, so long as there is a Church of England, will always play their part. It is the nature of the beast: what makes it good in many ways, also creates the very high risk it poses to children.

Going beyond the reasons why

42. We need to go beyond the reasons why. No doubt, for devotees of the CofE and history buffs, the causes of this institutional sclerosis are fascinating.

43. For the victims of abuse, it is stomach churning.

  • It is of no interest to them why the Anglican Church has failed.
  • It is of no interest to them to hear the Archbishop quote the Bible, recite platitudes or even weep in sorrow.
  • It is of no interest to them to debate the theological arguments surrounding the Seal of the Confessional.

44. We drown in a sea of platitudes and an alphabet-soup (DSAs, ISVAs, NST, DSA, ADSA.) of child-safety acronyms that even the witnesses and Ms Scolding struggled to articulate with confidence.

45. It is, I suggest, of limited relevance to you. The purpose of analysing why the Church failed is not for you to make recommendations about how it might improve matters by doing this, or that. It is to confirm in your own mind that the Church really has failed for reasons that are inherent to its very nature will not change without external, truly independent, state regulation.

46. Because all decent people – victims or not, Anglicans or not –  simply want all reasonably practicable measures to be taken to make it stop. That is the acid-test we require in our Health & Safety legislation. It is the acid-test that only state-regulation can provide for child-protection. How the Church meets these minimum standards is up to them. Do not, we beg you, get sucked into making specific recommendations about how this byzantine institution goes about meeting those standards: it is up to them and whatever guidance the regulator gives. If they fail, they face the regulatory consequences, like everybody else.

47. There is nothing special about the CofE. It is no answer to a factory in breach of health & safety regulations that it is special because it a) makes specialist aircraft parts, b) believes this, that and the other, c) and arranges its management structure in a peculiar way. It is irrelevant.

48. So much of this is institutional special pleading. When the Archbishop of Canterbury objects to our proposal because it would mean radical change, the sub-text is this: We are special, We are too big too fail. The answer is: you are not special and you may be too big to succeed. But if you are saying, we may not be able to meet minimum standards, therefore they pose an existential threat: you are right and so it should be.

49. You must bend to the needs of the community like everyone else. The Seal of the Sacrament is a good example: we are not interested in a theological debate about the pros and cons of the Seal and its limited exception dating back to 1603. The rule is, you report abuse to the statutory authorities however you learn of it.We are in favour of Mandatory Reporting in the form as advocated by the pressure group Mandate Now.

The Regulator

Mandatory Reporting

50. We have always said we envisaged a child-safety regulator as a statutory body akin to the the Health & Safety Executive (‘HSE’). The history of the HSE is a long one: the first of the so-called Factory Acts was in 1803. They were enacted to protect children from exploitation in the cotton mills. Having heard the evidence in this Inquiry we say it is remarkable that in 2019, no such similar body exists for the protection of children from sexual and physical abuse.

51. Features of this regulator are designed to catch all children looked after by organisations.

  1. The regulator will cover all organisations which look after children. Very small groups such as childminders are regulated by ofsted. Consideration will be given to exempting such small organisations.
  2. The independent statutory body would enforce basic standards of safeguarding. To do this the statutory body would establish:
    1. A Register of Institutions fit to look after children. To be considered fit and join the register the institution would have to satisfy basic safety criteria.
    2. It would be an offence to look after children without being on the Register.
    3. To be on the Register the institution will have to introduce a corporate structure. This will enable accountability.
    4. The registered institution should be forced to adhere to the minimum standards of safeguarding of those in its care.
    5. The independent body would have the power to prosecute organisations for breaches of regulations. Fines would be imposed for breaches. Organisations could be prevented from working with children. Sanction could include safeguarding agreements or their equivalent not just for individuals but for corporations.
    6. All complaints would be passed from the regulated institution to this independent body by any receiving institution with a criminal sanction for failing to do so.
    7. The body would require a detailed report on the complaint to satisfy the body that its investigation adheres to minimum standards. The body would have the power to gather information from complainants, regulated institutions and third parties and would take over the handling of cases where there was significant concern. It would have the power to compel disclosure of material.
    8. The body would liaise with and assist civil authorities such as the Police and Social Services. The body would ensure that police and other statutory organisations are taking appropriate action within reasonable timescale.
    9. Where an allegation has been made the body would investigate complaints using a “balance of probabilities” standard of proof.  There would be no statute of limitations under this scheme. The independent body would have the power to make awards of compensation similar to the CICA. It would have the power to decide on the support to be offered to a complainant and a scheme would be established to provide adequate compensation taking into account the effects on quality of life and a series of factors.
    10. Complainants will be allowed to take advice from lawyers and a contribution to legal costs would be awarded.
    11. The cost of the body’s work would be paid from a levy on institutions and those culpable would pay for the costs of dealing with individual cases in which they are involved.




JULY 2019


IICSA Peter Ball investigation 23-27 July 2018


Peter Ball (Anglican) Investigation

23rd to 27th July 2018

23rd July 2018

Counsel to the Inquiry, Fiona Scolding QC explained the questions to be asked over the next few week. They are :-

  1. Why had Peter Ball (PB) escaped detection as an abuser before 1992 ?
  2. How did the church allow his scheme to run without supervision ?
  3. Why did he receive a caution rather than being prosecuted ?
  4. His lawyer was also the diocesan registrar – was there not a conflict ?
  5. Was it wrong for the diocese of Chichester to have employed Brian Tyler the private investigator ?
  6. Were the police put under undue pressure by prominent people ?
  7. Why could a Bishop have been free from any sanction from the church until 2016 ?
  8. Why was PB allowed back into public ministry and schools ?
  9. Why didn’t Lambeth Palace pass on letters it had received making similar complaints to Neil Todd to the police ?
  10. Was an internal church investigation in 1992/3 adequate ?
  11. Why did the CPS accept guilty pleas to lesser charges in 2015 ? Why was there no trial ?
  12. Would the church do the same again today ?
  13. What steps do the church, police and society need to take to prevent this happening again ?
  14. Is “grooming” widespread in the church ?

PB became Bishop of Gloucester in 1992. He had been suffragan Bishop of Lewes from the 1970s. In the 1960s he set up the community of the glorious ascension. He spoke at public schools and set up his “give a year to god” scheme in 1980.Boys heard about it through schools and joined. Vickery House (another abuser) supervised the “schemers”. Most were just over 18 years old. Some were sent there from school, one was under 16 when he went.

PB agreed to plead to misconduct in a public office in 2015 on the basis that he had used his public office to obtain sexual gratification, had convinced the schemer that their chances in the church would be greater if he engaged in naked touching and used the scheme to assist his offending behaviour. The abuse included naked touching, naked prayer, inciting a boy to masturbate in a counselling session, naked kneeling at a baptism, suggesting flinging off underpants as a sign boys would be free in religion, asking boys to massage him in the groin area, ejaculating in their presence, spanking and flagellation of boys. Indecent assaults included beating with a sexual motive. There were 32 allegations in total. 13 were under 18. 2 had still been in school.

PB ‘s offending was brought to light by Neil Todd, a schemer who was with PB at Gloucester. He complained of beatings and indecent assaults to the housekeeper and gardener, Mr and Mrs Moss who took Neil away on holiday to France with them in September 1992. On their return Neil was in a state of anguish and the Moss’s went to see the former Bishop of Gloucester, John Yates who had become the Archbishop of Canterbury’s staff Bishop. He told them “What do you expect me to do ?”

Neil eventually left Gloucester and went t work in a parish in Brixton where another former schemer looked after him but after Neil had tried to kill himself his parents stepped in and informed the police.

Here began a sorry tale…

These were turbulent times for the Anglican church. The ordination of women threatened to split the church. Charles and Di were splitting and then this…

At the same time as Neil Todd was speaking to the police about his abuse others were making complaints about PB’s behaviour. 4 letters were sent to Lambeth palace and were seen and responded to by George Carey, the Archbishop of Canterbury. John Yates advised Carey he would have to investigate the allegations in the letters and that PB may have to resign. Despite this advice Carey did not pass the letters to the police and sent a message to all parishes in Gloucester that they should pray that the case is resolved in PB’s favour. There was no mention of Neil Todd or the other complainants. Carey actually wrote to the Chief Constable of Gloucester police to say this type of behaviour is not in PB’s character.

Letters were written by the great and the good supporting PB and denying that he could have committed crime. These included letters from a Court of appeal judge and heads of public schools.

The church set about recruiting a private investigator to discredit the complainants. In fact this investigator uncovered more evidence of PB’s misdeeds and set about trying to minimise the damage by trying to persuade the police to caution rather than charge Ball.

  • After PB was cautioned how did the church treat him ?
  • PB was not put on the Archbishop’s list
  • PB complained he was forced to resign
  • By Jan 1995 Carey allowed him limited permission to officiate
  • PB was allowed to have more and more church engagements
  • In Jan 1996 Carey allowed PB to do confirmations and preaching at schools
  • PB tried to convince Charles Windsor and others of his innocence
  • PB asked for and was given money
  • A 2000 review of the case suggested PB had been treated very leniently but despite recommendations to cut ties with PB, Carey and Rowan Williams simply told PB not to do confirmations in schools.
  • In 2008 his case was reviewed and an assessment by a psychologist was recommended. This took place in 2010. It showed PB had a lack of insight into offending, that he was highly manipulative and had a sexual interest on post-pubescent boys.

Eventually Phil Johnson complained about PB and a review of files was recommended. Kate Wood had gathered files together and they were passed to the police in 2012 sparking Sussex police to open Operation Dunhill leading to the convictions of PB and Vickery House.

At this point the opening statement from Core Participants represented by Switalskis was read. Here it is :-




  1. The story of Peter Ball is the story of the Establishment at work in modern times. It is the story of how the Establishment  a) minimised the nature of Peter Ball’s misdeeds b) tried to minimise the consequences for him and the Church c) silenced and harassed those who tried to complain.
  2. The Church of England is the Established Church of England. It is the mother church of an ever greater International Anglican Communion. The Queen is the Supreme Governor of the Church of England. The 26 must senior bishops sit as Lords Spiritual in the House of Lords. The Supreme Governor formally appoints high-ranking members of the church, including bishops, on the advice of the Prime Minister, who is in turn advised by church leaders. It is an institution that is directly plugged-in at the heart of our Constitution. It is innately powerful by design.
  3. Peter Ball was able to call upon the willing assistance of the Establishment.  It included the heir to the Throne, the Archbishop and a senior member of the judiciary, to name only the most prominent. In combination they provided Peter Ball with:
  4. Money and accommodation;
  5. Legal advice
  6. His own private detective to undermine the credibility of complainants;
  7. Emotional support;
  8. References;
  9. Approaches to the police and prosecuting authorities on his behalf;
  10. And, in the case, of AB Carey a lengthy witness statement in 2014 to try and stop further charges being tried [MPS002746_001].
  • The alacrity and extent of their response to one of their own in trouble was impressive. It is a horrible contrast to the way Peter Ball’s victims were treated. You will hear this afternoon from the Reverend Graham Sawyer and the lifetime of harassment he experienced from within the Church for daring to complain about Peter Ball and others. When AB Carey was presented with demands (after PB’s caution)  for an apology and steps to taken to ensure PB was never entrusted with responsibility for young men in the future, his response in his own handwriting was a) ‘I want to speak to a Senior Policeman about Peter’ and ‘We resist such demands’.   [ACE003298_193]. It was Bishop Kemp who paid for and sanctioned the use of Brian Tyler to try to undermine the police investigation. The Archbishop knew about this.
  • These Establishment helpers claim they were duped by Peter Ball. You will have to consider whether that is credible – given what they must have known or could easily have found out about Peter Ball. Prince Charles has many advisers. He only had to ask what a ‘caution’ meant. So does the Archbishop of Canterbury. Lambeth Palace had even the benefit of a Private Detective reporting from Peter Ball’s own mouth exactly what Peter Ball had done [BBC000004_001]. We know that other letters suggesting further abuse by PC were not passed to police in 1992/3. They were suppressed. A Lord Justice of the Court of Appeal knows the significance of a ‘caution’.
  • But even if you accepted their claim  – that they did not know what Peter Ball had done, that they were ‘largely in the dark’ or that they thought Peter Ball was ‘basically innocent’ – what these helpers were prepared to do was to lean against, add their weight against, the criminal process. They assume, even today – it is part of the mitigation they advance – that as members of the Establishment they are entitled, even duty-bound, to weigh-in on behalf of their Establishment friends accused of serious crimes – even when they are not sure (on their case) what’s been alleged.  In doing so, they went far beyond the normal obligations of friendship.
  • An important part of this Investigation will be for you to determine whether, in fact, the influence that was brought to bear upon the prosecuting authorities in 1992/1993 altered the way Peter Ball was treated. We believe it did. Consciously or unconsciously the weight of influence brought to bear meant Peter Ball received the lowest possible sanction in 1992, when, without his Establishment friends, he would have faced the prison sentence he eventually got. At the very least, as  DI Murdock put it, ‘…had the Church provided us with all the information held on Bishop Peter Ball back in 1992/3 then it might have been possible for us to have identified more victims and therefore present more charges and evidence to the CPS and DPP for consideration.”[GSP000012_087-7].
  • How could this have come about?
    1. Teaching, practice and theology
      1. PB committed his particular style of abuse – nakedness, flagellation, mutual masturbation –  as if it were the practice of St Francis. He must have known that was nonsense. But his authority and religious aura gulled his victims. No one challenged this until the first police investigation.
      2. Religion creates its own permissive atmosphere for abuse and biddable victims. The young and vulnerable are particularly susceptible to confidence tricks of this sort.
    2. Hierarchical structure and concentrations of power
      1. Each of the 42 bishops in CofE is largely unaccountable in his or her own diocese. Only in 2016 was there a mechanism put in place under the Church Disciplinary Measures to suspend or remove a bishop in office (s.24(2) CDM 2003). Even then, such penalty has to be confirmed by the Queen by Order in Council.
      2. DI Murdock was told by Lambeth Palace at the time of his investigations that ‘there was nothing the Church could do to remove Peter Ball from office’ [GSP000012_048 para 253].
  • The consequence of that was that Peter Ball was allowed to use his resignation as a bargaining chip to secure a lighter penalty. It was only something he could offer.
  1. Culture & traditions
    1. The story of Peter Ball reveals a culture of deference towards senior clergy:
      • A reluctance to believe that a ‘saintly’ figure could have committed these types of offences.
      • A reluctance to trust to the secular authorities to handle the matter.
      • A willingness to forgive and reintegrate PB, no matter, what PB had done.
    2. It also reveals confusion about the Church’s attitude towards homosexuality in its ranks:
      • DI Murdock makes clear that one of the factors that influenced his view of the public interest in bringing a prosecution was the risk that some Church witnesses would be exposed as homosexuals in court that ‘would have seen their roles within the Church effectively finished’.   [GSP000012_048 para 265] and ‘I believe that the issue of homosexuality had a detrimental effect in encouraging witnesses and potential complainants within the Church to come forward.’ [GSP00012_048 para 348].
  • All these are matters that support the measures we have advocated at the Benedictine hearings namely:
    1. The creation of a ‘failure to report’ offence;
    2. The creation of a ‘failure to protect’ offence;
    3. The extension of ‘position of trust’ offences;
    4. The creation of a statutory body with powers to police and enforce basic standards of child protection.



22nd JULY 2018


Opening remarks of Core Participants represented by Slater and Gordon followed which were :-

  • Bishops became accomplices in the attempted cover up of PB’s crimes
  • Carey was the most culpable as he deliberately concealed the 4 letters
  • Others such as Police, CPS and members of the establishment have some explaining to do
  • There is then a complaint about Charles Windsor having submitted a letter rather than a statement. It is questioned whether Charles Windsor has been less than frank about his contacts with PB after 1993.

At this point Fiona Scolding QC (counsel to the Inquiry) explained there had been lengthy discussions with Charles Windsor’s lawyers about the format of his submission. His lawyers, Harbottle and Lewis tried to object to providing a statement due to personal privacy reasons, data protection, confidentiality and human rights but she insisted he would be treated the same as anyone else. A section 21 request was withdrawn when a statement with a statement of truth was provided.

Neil Giffin QC for the Archbishop’s council said the church is sorry and ashamed. Safeguarding has changed. The NSSG has accepted all 11 recommendations and has begun to implement them but can’t be complacent.

Mr Bourne, Lord Carey’s lawyer, acknowledged that he had made serious mistakes and was too easily persuaded that PB was a man of integrity. He accepts the letters should have been shared with the police but notes there was only one further allegation in them (this is a disputed fact). He makes the point that there is a difference between a concealment or cover up and an error of judgement.

Mr Brown for the CPS explained the legalities of what was possible in terms of charges at the time. He confirms that in the present day PB would have been charged without question. He goes on to laud the CPS for using the offence of misconduct in public office.

Mr Boyle for Gloucester police explained Gloucester the police investigation was thorough. 60 witness statements were take. A 600 page report was prepared.

A117 gave evidence as a complainant. He was a good looking tanned young man with dark hair and designer stubble wearing a open necked white shirt and a dark blazer. He spoke in a soft but clear voice.

A117 was a schemer in the late 1980s. He explained how he was duped by PB into taking cold showers and being watched by Ball under the pretext of the Franciscan way being to lose one’s ego and pride. This became naked touching and eventually flagellation on the buttocks with a long wooden clothes brush as punishments for having masturbated.

A10 was a smart man in his late 40s wearing a suit.

A10 explained PB wanted to have discussions about sex and tried to persuade him to have sex. He felt PB was very manipulative. A10 was one of those who had written to Carey. PB had talked to him about having dinner with the Queen, Charles and the Queen Mum. He described PB as part Rasputin and part Tartouffe.

Graham Sawyer gave evidence standing, wearing a white shirt and tie. He was a smart man in his 50s with a clear received pronunciation accent.

He explained PB had the reputation of being a living saint. Graham met with PB a few times as after school he wasted to become ordained. He didn’t want to join his scheme in the early 1980s but was initially sponsored by PB for ordination. During their meetings PB insisted that Graham take his clothes off and on 3 or 4 occasions PB did this. On the last occasion Graham resisted and felt he had to withdraw from the ordination path as PB told him he would no longer sponsor him.

Graham went to Durham University and did jobs but in 1984 felt the calling again and applied for ordination and found that there was a black mark against his name. He was told this by a chaplain at Durham he knew had enquired for him. Graham had to qualify as a deacon in New Zealand. He met Rowan Williams in Sydney in 2000 who asked him to come to be a priest in Monmouthshire where he was then the Bishop.

There he suffered a series of harassments from senior clergy relating to his complaints about Peter Ball. He described the way in which Bishops close ranks as the “purple circle”. He said one retired Bishop in Newcastle Australia described it as an ecclesiastical protection racket. His main complaints are against Bishop Dominic Walker and Archdeacon Ken Sharp. The pressure was so much he returned to Australia. Graham was one of those included in the misfeasance charge against PB.



Graham Sawyer’s recommendations are :-

  • Take away the church’s ability to receive the first complaints as it tends to try to quash them at source.
  • Ensure Mandatory Reporting is imposed from outside
  • Ensure probity and transparency
  • The church can’t police itself
  • Need a system completely independent of the church to receive reports
  • Diocesan Safeguarding Adviser system cannot work as they are all different and all beholden to the Bishop.
  • All these new protocols are good but people let them down
  • We need a completely independent organisation
  • The Australian brought in independence almost immediately after the Commission reported – why can’t the UK Anglican church ?
  • The church is an easy place for paedophiles to operate.

24th July 2018

George Carey (Former Archbishop of Canterbury) – speaks clearly, wearing a Bishop’s purple shirt and dog collar. Short grey hair and dark-rimmed spectacles.

He was frustrated he couldn’t get rid of PB at the time according to ecclesiastical procedures as PB was a Bishop.

George Carey (GC) believes in the holiness and integrity of life and that clergy must maintain the highest moral standards. “I told my ordination students : you must not go back on your ordination vows”

He went on to say he’s dealt with an ordinand who was cautioned in 1985 and the police had told him the procedure then.

He believes the vast majority of clergy men and women are honourable.

Child protection was not at the forefront on its issues in 1992/3. We didn’t understand people can have an evil and negative effect.

I couldn’t believe a Bishop could do this. I actually believed him for quite a time.

We thought that because it wasn’t penetrative sex it was the lowest of the low and the police gave him a caution which was the lowest penalty.

GC maintained not a lot was known about child protection in 1992.

The first time I met PB was when I confronted him in December 1992.

There was discussion on how it was that PB was selected for the post in Gloucester. Sir Robin Catford had pushed him forward to John Major against the vote in the Canonical appointments Commission. Ball had been number 2.

It emerged that Mr and Mrs Moss had been to see John Yates to tell him about PB and Neil Todd but GC said he hadn’t told him. GC agreed it was a big thing – “he should have told me”.

Then Ball was arrested on 12th Dec. GC saw them merely as allegations at that stage. He has a pastoral meeting on 15th Dec with PB and his twin brother, Michael in Lambeth. PB was indignant and protested his innocence. After the meeting GC wrote PB a letter which GC describes as “sickly” saying “The matter does not diminish my admiration for you and my determination to keep you on the episcopal bench”. (This appears to be blind support ?).

The four letters.

When questioned about the four letters he didn’t pass to the police he said “It wasn’t in our mindset to pass them to the police”.

There was discussion about a particularly strong letter mentioning cover up. It transpired that GC was replying to the 4 letters when John Yates was meeting with DI Murdoch in the next room at Lambeth (unbeknown to GC).

There was a letter from a mother upset at homosexual advances to her son. Another boy had been asked to masturbate in a school counselling session in front of PB.

Asked “why didn’t you give the letters to the police?” GC replied “The police never asked for them”. Fiona Scolding replied that the police didn’t know they existed so couldn’t ask for them. GC said “We had no awareness that we should pass them to the police”

GC admitted that the internal investigation was “not up to much” and “fizzled out”.

GC said “This is very embarrassing we were fobbing people off. We delayed”

GC then explained that his personal letter to all Gloucester parishes to “pray that PB’s name will be cleared” was a very rare thing to send round but said “I couldn’t assume Peter was guilty”. For me there was still an open mind on his innocence. GC apologised that he had shown little concern for the victims.

Archbishop’s list

Asked why he didn’t put PB on the list GC replied “I decided he was sick and has resigned. What damage can he do ?”

“There is such a thing as grace, renewal and restitution”

I later recognised how manipulative he was.

In a meeting of 29th Jan 1993 the letters were passed to PB’s legal team but not to the police.

Tyler report

GC admitted Eric Kemp (Bishop of Chichester) paid for it. Lambeth knew of the report. Tyler briefed Yates. GC :”I saw it as someone else (Kemp) handling it”.

GC’s letter to Chief Constable of Gloucester

This letter states (among other things) “The testimony of the many young men he has helped over the years – and the list must run into the hundreds – is such that if guilty of unprofessional behaviour it is quite unrepresentative of his lifestyle”.

(This suggests Carey has no appreciation of his own office – ie an Archbishop should not be writing this type of special pleading to a police officer as he is bound to be putting pressure on him. The letter states on its face it is not trying to put pressure on him but in fact it was by its existence calculated to exert pressure).

GC says “I felt it was the honourable thing to do”.


I gave him £12,500 from our funds. Some for legal fees some for a holiday.

PB’s return to ministry

GC didn’t put him on the Archbishop’s list as he wanted him back into ministry as he has such gifts. John Yates and Colin Fletcher had urged him to put his foot down. Fletcher described PB ar status driven, money driven and manipulative.

GC allowed a gradual return to ministry eventually declaring to all Bishops that he should be treated like any other retired Bishop.

GC even stated in a 1998 letter that PB was “basically innocent”. GC felt that PB had lost such a lot he needed to help him.

GC admitted he gave a statement for PB’s defence urging the judge not to put him on trial as he’d already been punished.

Ivor Frank (panel member) reminded him that despite GC stating he believed in his innocence he has stated in a memo that he had appreciated what he had done and was “horrified” This casts some doubt of GC’s truthfulness when he said in his evidence he wanted to keep an open mind (and indeed urged others to pray for his acquittal).

Andrew Purkiss , a press adviser at Lambeth gave evidence of his involvement.

Former Det Supt Wayne Murdoch (WM) of Gloucester police, a man in his 60s with grey hair, a grey moustache, dark jacket and tie gave evidence.

When he was assigned the case in December 1992 he wanted to get to Neil Todd quickly as he thought there would be “some reaction” and he felt well placed to resist outside influence.

Neil Todd (NT) just wanted PB to admit what he’d done was wrong, removed from office and that no-one else would go through what he had endured.

Mr Murcoch interviewed Mr and Mrs Moss and the Gloucester chaplain, Rev Eldridge. Then he had reasonable grounds to arrest PB.

Mr Murdoch related his association (through being taught by) Brother Ken Penfold. He had taught WM at the technical college. Ken was a brother of the glorious ascension. WM said he used this knowledge to get PB talking during interview (to avoid a no comment interview).

He recalls there were 3 tapes used in the interviews under caution. Tape 1 was a denial. Tape 2 was PB agreeing to a lot of nudity and tape 3 contained admissions that he had beaten NT and agreed he had sent him a letter and talked about genital and non genital love. He mentioned ejaculation as being caused by some medical condition.

Did the letters from worthies had any influence on him ?

Letters from the head of Lancing college and Lord Lloyd were read out.

WM only commented “If those people knew what I knew they wouldn’t have written them letters”.

WM recalls a phone call in which he said “I know the DPP. I would like to influence her but I won’t”.

Dealings with John Yates at Lambeth palace

He had a meeting in December at Lambeth palace. With John Yates. “I asked for everything they had”

“Yates didn’t tell me they had files on people. I would have expected them to volunteer anything they held on a Bishop to the detriment.”

To the suggestion the church say he should have asked he replied “That’s a strange way of looking at things especially an Archbishop of Canterbury”.

A memo written by Yates of the meeting records part of the advice or options for the case given by WM was “CPS may not prosecute – non in public interest but Peter’s resignation may be a bargaining counter” WM agreed this is only one possible outcome and he may have said that (here WM seems to have predicted the future ?).

What if WM had been given the letters ?

WM says it may have made a difference to the outcome “but we should have been the judge of that not the Archbishop”.

There was an exchange around WM’s feeling that the church’s hostility to homosexuality internally may have put some people off giving evidence (gay clergy feeling it would damage their careers if they came forward. There are echoes of Graham Sawyer’s situation here).

Michael Ball

WM found out Michael Ball had been interfering with witnesses and was behind a lot of the letters. WM cautioned PB’s solicitor to tell him Michael was very close to being arrested for perverting the course of justice.

Tyler was also getting to people before the police could speak to them. He likewise was close to perverting the course of justice.

Bishop Eric Kemp

It appears Bishop Eric Kemp participated in an attempt to derail the investigation. He had a meeting with WM which was being covertly tape recorded and in which he had arranged to pull back the curtains for Tyler to burst in and confront WM if he had said anything which could affect the evidence.

Sup’t John Horan was the son of the Bishop of Tewkesbury but had no contact with WM other than to tell him his dealings with PB.

Tyler report

WM commented :-

  • I didn’t know Tyler
  • I didn’t say I’d give him statements
  • Tyler is making himself out to have done a wonderful job
  • I am angry with what Tyler has said and done
  • Tyler tried to dissuade witnesses from giving evidence
  • Tyler embellished that took place for his own financial gain

WM re-states that all he agreed to do at the meeting at the Crest Hotel in January 1993 with PB’s legal team and Tyler was to pass on the offer to accept a caution to the DPP.

WM’s 600 page report

He set out only options for charge, not caution. Misconduct in a public office was not on the radar back then. WM wanted charges not a caution.

He personally delivered the 600 page report t the DPP office and there was a later meeting not attended by the DPP (she was in New Zealand).

There is no note of this meeting and the recommendation for a caution emerged. WM says it fitted with NT’s wishes so he ran with that. He rand NT and he was content.

Ivor Frank (panel member) expressed concern that he had mentioned in his report that a consideration in the decision making process on public interest was whether many schemers would have felt duped if Ball was charged – that they would feel their study was groundless. The writer was left with the feeling that WM had a soft spot for the church, didn’t want to do it any damage and that held him back from being more robust in pushing for charges.

Det Sup’t Carwyn Hughes (CU)– a man in his 50s – a smartly dressed precise man.

Head of Sussex police Op Dunhill

Op Dunhill started on 25.07.12. He brought Kate Wood in to help his team. 7 more schemers came forward and 4 more after conviction of PB. NT died in August 2012 and that set the tone for the inquiry. Gemma Wadsworth was an ISVA who helped complainants.

CU was not influenced by the fact a staff officer for Charles Windsor asked whether there were any embarrassing things in letters between PB and CW.

He found the Gloucester file to be in good order. He was unconvinced by Tyler. There was some criticism that the caution had not been properly offered or administered as little evidence of admissions.

He had to grapple with whether there had been some immunity given to PB. This caused delay and some loss of confidence from complainants.

Eventually misconduct in public office and a basis of plea was agreed. Phil Johnson was very unhappy that his offence had not been charged. The other potential charge was unhappy but accepting. 3 more complainants came forward but not in public interest as pre-dated 1992. One was an offence of indecent assault in 1995 when PB took a 15 year old to play squash. He didn’t want to pursue it so no action.

He had also recommended no action against Carey in his dealings with PB.

A statement of Ian Beer (head of Lancing College) was read. He had supported PB in a long letter but realised on his conviction that he had been wrong to do so.


Gregor McGill (DPP’s office) – a smart man in his 50s. Wearing a suit, shaved head and dark rimmed spectacles

The case was dealt with centrally to demonstrate independence from local influences.

It was common to receive letters from MPs. There is nothing to suggest the letters had any influence on decision makers. 1,284 letters and media interest were irrelevant to the decision making.

A document (note of a telephone conversation with DI Wayne Murdoch) CPS000792_0348 showed that Ball could get a possible caution if he resigns.

In Mr McGill’s opinion the fact someone has to resign makes the case more serious as it demonstrates the seriousness. This means it was out of the caution category of offenses.

A CPS briefing note CPS000792_0351 was referred to which showed the caution was given because :-

1)Trial likely to be strongly contested

2) Prosecution witnesses were fragile

3) Offending at low end of the scale

4) Main objective for Neil Todd was Ball’s resignation

5) Acceptance of caution would be the end of Ball’s career. He’s indicated he’ll resign if gets a caution.

Fiona Scolding QC then took Mr McGill through the Home office guidance on cautions in place at the time and demonstrated with Mr McGill that none of the prerequisites were established. Mr McGill said “I don’t think the caution was administered in accordance with Home Office guidelines”. There was a lack of an unequivocal admission and no specifics of the acts Ball was cautioned for.

2012-15 Operation Dunhill

He agreed the delay in a decision on charge was unacceptable. The CPS file had been submitted in 2013 and a decision on charge was only made in late 2014.

He extolled the virtues of Alison Levitt QC who had considered all aspects carefully and suggested the misconduct in public office offence which caught most of his offending.

PB argued :-

  • He was too ill to stand trial
  • The post of a Bishop was not a public office
  • He had been given immunity from further prosecution

These abuse of process arguments took 12 months to be finalised.

A process than took place whereby Ball’s barrister spoke to the CPS barrister to try to work out a basis of plea.

It was recorded that once this agreement was reached (that he would plead guilty if the indecent assaults against Phil Johnson and Graham Sawyer were to lie on file Phil Johnson complained that he had not been consulted beforehand and had been handed a fait accompli. (CPS002280).

Mr McGill agreed position of trust offences could be expanded from the present position to encompass more abusers such as clergy but this would have to be done by parliament.

Malcolm Evans (Panel member) asked whether Bishops of other denominations could be public officers. Mr McGill replied he thought they could if they carried out public duties such as baptisms and weddings. It’s all about the role someone carries out.

Andrew Nunn (Lambeth palace staff) Man in his 50s with a suit and tie. Bald with dark rimmed spectacled.

He had spent 25 years working at Lambeth palace. He knew a lot about the PB affair and had always thought George Carey had ignored advice to cut ties with Ball. He spoke of Ball’s manipulative behaviour in taking Carey’s promises to restore him in vain.


Mr Nunn stated that Carey still said he believed Ball was innocent even after his caution. There were a series of enlightening notes at INQ000616 where Nunn criticises Carey and Carey takes a swipe back at his critics.


Anthony Lloyd (AL) (Formerly Law Lord – Lord Lloyd of Berwick) – A man in his 80s. Thick white hair. Round rimmed specs. Alert and with a cut glass accent.

Had been a barrister, High Court judge, Court of Appeal judge and Law Lord 1992-1998

Peter Ball (PB) was his nearest neighbour at Berwick, East Sussex. He though Ball had remarkable preaching skills. “We became good friends and still are”.

“I became aware of press reports of sexual activity with Neil Todd a 17 year old. Because of his age I didn’t think it was a serious offence although it was a great shock to me”.

AL recalled the telephone conversation he had with DI Wayne Murdoch and admitted he probably did say he knew the DPP and wanted to influence her but wouldn’t. He said he just wanted to find out what was going on.

He denied other people could have perceived he was trying to interfere with the investigation (AL appeared to have little insight into what others thought of him and his position although admitted he referred to himself as a Law Lord to his correspondents when in oral evidence he said he just wanted to find out what was happening). Was there a lack of insight or did AL know what he was doing throughout ?

He then wrote to the chief constable of Gloucester, Mr Pacey on Court of Appeal headed paper OHY000096_070. AL denied trying to influence the investigation.

“I wrote a similar letter to the DPP letting her know how highly I regarded him” (PB).

He wrote to the Archbishop of Canterbury. There was a reference to the two of them having met at an all male “establishment” dining club called “Nobody’s Friends” This was half Bishops and half establishment figures (according to the Daily Mail quoted by Fiona Scolding QC). The letter was at ACE000877_001.

AL recalls in the summer of 1994 he was in favour of finding PB something to do and had a friend who was the patron of a Parish (he got to decide who would be the vicar) and wanted to get PB appointed. This plan didn’t materialise principally due to advice from George Carey (his memo is at ACE000877_001)

Throught out his evidence displayed a staggering lack of insight – he appears to be entirely ignoring any concerns for the safety of children or understanding of the seriousness of PB’s offending. He also has no perception of the weight his position as a court of appeal judge and law lord carried.

AL went on in 2009 to complain bitterly on PB’s behalf that he was being required to undergo a psychological assessment. AL described this as cruel and that PB should have had more of an explanation. At WWS000071_023 Lord Lloyd is recorded as having made a threat that some powerful people will be very upset. AL doesn’t recall having said that.

Interestingly a letter he writes at ACE001491 is written on notepaper of the House of Lords judicial appeal committee. At that stage he was not on the committee (having left in 1998). Was he authorised to use that paper ? Should the police investigate whether he has tried to deceive by this (possibly unauthorised) use of official paper ?

When the psychological assessment was carried out he described it as “meaningless”. In his oral evidence to IICSA he agreed he would withdraw that remark with apologies.

He wrote a letter to Kier Starmer CPS001584_001 “to try to get him to make a decision”.

Letter from Charles Windsor (read by Fiona Scolding QC)

Essentially Charles Windsor (CW) became good friends with PB. CW didn’t find out what the “indiscretion” was that had caused him to resign from being the Bishop of Gloucester and maintained a fairly close relationship with PB throughout the 1990s and 2000s until 2015 when PB was convicted.

CW gave him gifts of money and caused the Duchy of Cornwall (his own private trust) to buy a house for him and rent it to him and his brother.

A series of letters between the two of them were read out in which PB essentially characterises himself as a victim of his accusers and people in high places. Charles agrees with him and supports him.

Kate Wood former police inspector and currently safeguarding consultant – in her 40s, blonde hair, dark rimmed specs, clear speech and pink jacket.

Kate Wood (KW) worked on and off at Lambeth Palace between 2008 and 2016. It was a bit like going back in time – physically imposing.

She makes the point that the church has in the past had a woefully low headcount on safeguarding posts.

The Mellows review pointed out a remarkable difference between the treatment of Ball and the treatment of other clergy in similar positions.

The Ball file past cases review entry was referred to ACE003069.

KW eventually got some Chichester files from Shirley Hosgood and was shocked and angry that she hadn’t had them before or that there hadn’t been brought to light before – a correspondence file contained the Tyler report. She makes the point that the Tyler report has to be taken with a pinch of salt but its existence was shocking to her. ACE005779.

From that point she passed the papers to the police and wirked with them on Op Dunhill

She recalls having spoken to Neil Todd ACE001870 and had no concerns about his demeanour.

Ivor Frank (panel member) asks a question about document ACE006861 – this was a suspicion by Andrew Nunn that Carey had either destroyed or taken some documents out of the file at some stage.

Moira Gibb (author of the Gibb report on the conduct of George Carey). In her 50s. Brown hair, Dark rimmed glasses. Beige dress. Clear confident speaker.

She wanted in her report to set out for the public what had gone wrong.

She believed Carey was partial. “There was a degree of personal compassion for Ball not matched by an understanding of the nature and consequences of Ball’s abusive conduct”.

She characterised Carey’s behaviour as positive action rather than omission in not passing the letters to the police.

Switalskis oral submissions were then delivered. They are reproduced here :




  1. Our submissions are in two parts:
  1. On the facts;
  2. On the recommendations that follow from those facts.


  1. There is a big lie at the heart of this case. The big lie is that PB’s most prominent supporters, starting with Archbishop George Carey, believed Peter Ball was ‘basically innocent’. GC is the man who micro-managed from the day of Ball’s arrest on 14/12/92 what can only be described as Peter Ball’s defence team.
  2. GC’s attitude:
  1. There was no conception at any time that the Church should provide voluntary assistance to the police in their inquiries. No conception that they should pass on information that pointed towards PB’s guilt, as well as information that pointed away from PB’s guilt. George Carey’s attitude then – and now – was ‘if the police don’t ask for these letters more fool them. It’s their job to prove it and if they can’t, good’. We must assume that he personally prayed that the police investigation would clear PB’s name. And that he did so, even when he possessed powerful evidence suggesting that PB’s crimes were not isolated to just Neil Todd.
  2. The letters were not provided to the police. But they were provided to Peter Ball’s defence team. The only inference you can draw from that is that the Church wanted to help Peter Ball but not the police.
  3. If you needed further evidence that the Church was completely one-sided, you have the evidence of Mr Murdock and the farcical attempt to compromise him by covert tape recordings when he visited Bishop Kemp.
  1. Carey did not believe Peter Ball was basically innocent. No reasonable person could have believed that after receiving the letters from the other complainants.The evidence against Peter Ball only got stronger after that.
  • Meeting with Ball brothers 15/12/92. If you read Carey’s statement (para 45 WWS000143_010) you would think that no admissions had been made: ‘both he and his brother protested his innocence’. If you read Carey’s statement to the police in 2014 [MPS002746_002], there were significant admissions from Peter Ball. “He accepted he had had a close relationship with Neil Todd but he denied he had touched him sexually in any non-consual way”. Which of course suggests he had touched him in a sexual way. GC knew then breach of trust of sexual nature with vulnerable adolescent.
  1. The letters he received from other complainants, vague as they were, were obviously, powerful support for Neil Todd’s central allegation. Either there was a conspiracy against Peter Ball – who was widely regarded as a saint – or they were telling the truth.
  2. ABC knew this. That is the true reason why:
    1. they were not passed to the police;
    2. Lambeth Palace made no attempt to contact these witnesses directly.
  1. These letters were, however, passed to Peter Ball’s defence team, in case they could assist him in proving his only realistic defence of a conspiracy against him.
  2. There are two significant documents missing from the Lambeth Palace file on Peter Ball.
  • The first is any record of the meeting Carey had with the Ball brothers on 15/12/92. It seems inconceivable that this meeting, attended by Frank Robson, was not minuted in any way. Or, if it was not minuted, that was deliberate. The reason no record is available is because it probably contained significant admissions by Peter Ball.
  1. The second is the absence of Tyler’s report. That report was expressly stated to be written solely for the attention of Bishop Kemp and the Archbishop of Canterbury. It set out the truth about Peter Ball.

“I am quite convinced he has been living a dual life, not only as a pseudo-religious, but also in his interpretations of sexual morality. Unfortunately, I came to the conclusion he had been involved in abusing not only his Office but very many young men who passed through his care.”

That was a conclusion he had reached having contacted many of the complainants and having had significant admissions direct from Peter Ball including “I did have an emission.” It stated exactly the nature of what Peter Ball had done.

    1. Bishop Kemp certainly knew it. If ABC had wanted to know the truth, he could have had the truth from Bishop Kemp. ABC knew there was a private investigator on the case (para 77 WWS000143_015). At the very least ABC needed to know why one of his Bishops was accepting a caution for gross indecency.  In all probability, he was told by one form of communication or another. But the record, like that of the meeting on 15/12/92 has been carefully expunged from the file.
  1. The reality is that ABC did not care what Ball had done. He only hoped and prayed that ‘the investigation will clear his name and that he will be restored to his great work of Christian ministry’, as he enjoined the Diocese of Gloucester to do in the New Year 1993 [ACE000255].
  2. The reality is that when they weighed what they knew PB had done against PB’s status as a Bishop, his undoubted talents, and the Church’s reputation, it didn’t count for very much. It is a charge we level at George Carey, Lord Lloyd and Prince of Wales.
  3. It was, of course, a mistake that the terms of the caution were not properly recorded. For all DI Murdock’’s hard work, the police seemed to have snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. It was a mistake that was ruthlessly exploited by Peter Ball to protest his ‘basic innocence’. It was a mistake ruthlessly exploited by George Carey to promote Peter Ball’s return to the ministry. Carey repeatedly misrepresented the gravity of what Peter Ball had done whenever he could. I know Mr O’Donnell will list the examples we have heard. So I will not repeat them.
  4. We do not know if ‘after the police caution…and my resignation [George Carey] made a ‘solemn promise’” to Peter Ball that the Church would not take any further action against me, ‘because I had been punished enough’ [ACE003088], 22/9/09. But certainly, Carey’s actions in office were consistent with a such a promise.
    1. The internal inquiry against Peter Ball was quietly dropped.
    1. Ball was not placed on the Lambeth list as he clearly should have been.
    2. GC took steps, only a few years after the caution, to gradually introduce Peter Ball to public ministry.
    3. He misrepresented the gravity of what Peter Ball had done whenever he could.
    4. Recommendation to House of Bishops in 1997 that Peter Ball be offered ministry, [ACE003298_122]
    5. He provided a statement to the police in 2014 to try to stop the trial of further charges against him.
  1. ABC wanted to return to the status ante quo  – as if what Peter Ball had done had never happened. He did all this against, on occasion, strong advice from inside and outside of the Church. He did all this knowing that Peter Ball was almost certainly guilty of serious wrongdoing against many young men. He, in the words of Andrew Nunn, did try to ‘sweep it under the carpet’. If ABC thought by doing so, he would protect the reputation of the Church, it was a gross misjudgment.
  2. The tactics deployed by the Church were at the very edge of lawfulness.  We heard how:
    1. Bishop Kemp attempted to compromise DI Murdock in a covertly recorded meeting.
    2. several Bishops telephoned Ros Hunt to ask her to tell the young men who had written complaints to the Archbishop not to speak to the police or the press.
    3. Michael Ball, Bishop of Truro, had been contacting witnesses and trying to influence them.
  1. We would encourage police to review whether any of these matters, in particular the actions of the Bishops who contacted Ros Hunt, disclose offences of perverting the course of justice.
  2. It is hard to know what practical effect Establishment support for Peter Ball had on the decision for a caution. Of its nature, its effects are pernicious, subtle, hard to trace and unaccountable.
  3. Certainly, it was calculated to have practical effect. Lady Renton accepted that the reason her husband wrote to the DPP on House of Commons papers was in the knowledge that it would be taken more seriously. In other words, it was not the merits of what the letter contained but the status of its author that was intended to influence the recipient. Similarly, a Court of Appeal Judge could have no proper reason calling the investigative officer apart from simply making it known that Peter Ball had powerful friends. Again, that was calculated to influence by sheer reason of the status of the caller. The aim was simply to get PB treated more lightly than otherwise.
  4. We do accept that the biggest difficulty facing the prosecution was the fragility of the complainants and the potential harm to them from a trial. The decision to caution was at the bottom end of the reasonable range of options for dealing with Peter Ball. We suspect that ultimately that proved the most politically expedient way of dealing with it. What is inexplicable is the complete failure to record the terms of the caution and record a clear admission from Peter Ball.
  5. Where Peter Ball’s establishment supporters certainly did have effect was in fortifiying George Carey in his intended aim of minimising Peter Ball’s wrong-doing and returning him to ministry. That would have been a much more difficult task if Peter Ball had not had powerful support from the senior figures in our society including the Prince of Wales, who was, apparently inviting Peter Ball to give him communion at his own house after the caution in 1993.
  6. This is properly described as an Establishment cover up. It succeeded by delaying the time when Peter Ball faced the full consequences of his wrong-doing. In doing so it greatly increased the suffering of his many victims.Position of Trust offences
  7. Recommendations
  1. Everybody condemns what Peter Ball did. The great irony is that if he committed those offences today, it would be more difficult to prosecute. The charge of gross indecency has gone. The age of consent for homosexuals has been harmonised with the rest of the population. The current position of trust offences are only expressly framed to protect  a limited class of person: school pupils and those in hospital. It is not obvious it would capture Peter Ball running his own Schemers. It is not satisfactory that these offences were – and would now – have to be shoehorned into an offence of misconduct in public office. That depends on the accident of whether the offender occupies a public office. The extension of POT need careful drafting. But it must be framed to capture people in a position like Peter Ball. It might be broadened to include the case where the offender has an established personal relationship with the victim in connection with the provision of religious, sporting, musical or other instruction to the victim.
  2. Mandatory reporting
  1. A new law should require professionals who work with children in ‘Regulated Activities’ to inform the LADO (‘Local Authority Designated Officer’) or, in appropriate circumstances, children’s services, where the professional knows, suspects, or has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting child abuse or sexual abuse by those in a position of trust. Failure to inform would be a criminal offence. Presently this is only guidance which is all too frequently ignored.
  2. Strong laws should lead cultural change. In the absence of law those staff who do report presently are, by default, whistle-blowers with very little protection. You have heard what happened Graham Sawyer. Without strong laws any institution – no matter how benign its culture – is vulnerable to a powerful person within that organisation acting without integrity.Statutory body
  1. The creation of a new independent statutory body to enforce basic standards of safeguarding, and to receive and deal with complaints of CSA in all institutions which are responsible for the care of children.
  2. 5.This new statutory body would police and enforce minimum national standards of child-safeguarding. This body would have similar powers to the Health & Safety Executive. The Health & Safety Executive operates for the safety of workers. Children are an even more vulnerable group. The absence of a powerful statutory body dedicated to their protection is a serious defect.
  3. The new independent statutory body will:
  1. Establish a register of relevant Institutions that look after children.
  2. It will be an offence to look after children without being on the register.
  3. To be on the register institutions have to introduce a corporate structure.
  4. Registered institutions will be forced to adhere to minimum safeguarding regulations.
  5. The body will have the power to prosecute regulated organisations for breaches of these regulations (similar to prosecutions by the Health & Safety Executive). Fines will be imposed.
  6. All complaints are to be passed to the independent body by a receiving institution with a criminal sanction for failing to do so.
  7. The body will gather information from complainants, regulated institutions and third parties. It will have the power to compel disclosure of material.
  8. It will liaise with and assist civil authorities such as the police and social services. It would ensure the police and other statutory organisations are taking appropriate action within reasonable timescales. It will have the power to compel the police to investigate and refer cases to the CPS.
  9. It will provide coordinated support to victims, particularly those required to give evidence.
  10. The body will investigate the complaint using the balance of probabilities as the standard of proof. There will be no statute of limitations. It will have the power to make an award of compensation, similar to the CICA. It will decide the support to be offered to the complainant. A scheme will be established to provide adequate compensation for victims of child sex abuse which takes into account the effect on quality of life and a series of relevant factors (as opposed to the rigid CICA system).
  11. Complainants will be allowed to take advice from lawyers and a contribution towards legal costs will be awarded.
  12. The cost of the body’s work, support, reparations and legal costs are to be paid from a levy on the institutions with those found culpable paying the costs of dealing with individual cases in which they are involved.
  13. It will provide to Government regular reports on its progress and, inter alia, the extent to which its activity is promoting the UK’s obligations under the UN convention on the Rights of the Child.

Charity Commission

  1. A review of the powers of the Charity Commission to change that status when serious child safeguarding concerns are revealed should be initiated. We were disturbed to learn that ABC was using discretionary funds at his disposal to provide significant financial support to PB.
  2. Conclusion
  1. The story of Peter Ball makes clear that even one individual in a position of power can undermine any amount of safeguarding, policy and cultural change within an institution. There was on such individual – George Carey – but he was handsomely supported by others.
  2. What this reveals is that the bonds of loyalty to the institution and its senior members is too great to allow them to the right thing. We cannot trust they will. What is required is independent oversight and criminal sanctions of the sort we have proposed.DAVID GREENWOOD, SWITALSKISClosing submissions were made on behalf of Slater and Gordon, the Archbishop’s council, George Carey and the CPSAlexis Jay (Chair) explained the panel would produce a report in the first quarter of 2019 dealing with Chichester and Peter Ball.27th July 2018
  3. David Greenwood
  4. Fiona Scolding QC closed by thanking all who have contributed. She explained there have been 53,000 pages of evidence to read, 118 statements and 14 live witnesses.
  5. 27h JULY 2018

IICSA Anglican Chichester week 3 summary


Anglican Inquiry

Diocese of Chichester

Notes of week 3 (19th to 23th March 2018)


A8 had known from an early age that he wanted to explore the monastic life. He considered the Benedictines, Franciscans and Peter Ball’s Order of the Glorious Ascension. He decided on Pater Ball’s “Give a Year to God” scheme which was just for a year and he felt it gave more freedom rather than the very serious atmospheres of the other monastic orders. The trainees were also young men to whom he could relate.

He lived at the Rectory at Littlington, sleeping on mattresses on floors, praying regularly from 5am and was encouraged to subjugate himself entirely to Peter Ball. He now recognises that this was a grooming process. He was sexually assaulted three times by Ball.

In 1992 he was called by a policeman about offences committed by Peter Ball but did not confirm he had been a victim. He became ordained but left the priesthood between 1997 and 2012. In 2012 he took on a set of parishes in Shropshire and told the suffragan Bishop of Ludlow about the Ball abuse. He took no action. He later told the Bishop of Hereford who also took no action.

A8 feels abuse is not about sex but about control. He feels the church tries to crush people who speak out. He feels apologies are used as weapons by the church, the actual message being “you’re not on our team any more. It’s a way of saying goodbye. He didn’t find apologies helpful or genuine.


A7 became interested in monasticism after hearing Peter Ball speak at his school in 1981. He thought it would be a good way to “find” himself. He got a lot of attention from Peter Ball and was happy and flattered by this attention from such a holy man.

Peter Ball has been head boy at Lancing College and A8 drew parallels between the boarding school set up and the Littlington scheme arrangements with young men sleeping in the same rooms, communal living etc.

A7 told us Ball wanted to “toughen us up”, getting us out of bed early for prayers and to work all day. “In reality we were snowflakes” A7 could see that most of the schemers were “on the edge”. Ball sexually assaulted A7 between April and August 1985.

A7 is unhappy that over the course of the 10 years subsequent to Ball’s caution the church manoeuvred him back into the position of any other retired Bishop. His theories are either:-

  • The church accepted his pleas of innocence and denials, or
  • The church had forgiven him, or
  • The church allowed him the elevated status because he was old and frail.

Bishop David Walker

Bishop David Walker, a tall thin cleric with white hair and short beard wore a purple shirt, dog collar and a cross. He is Bishop of Manchester and lead on religious communities

He has a role in relation to monastic orders, religious communities. He explained he has no power over them but can carry out a visit to each community every 5 years. The only sanction he has is to remove the Order from the advisory council.

Graham Tilby

Graham Tilby (GT) wore a suit and tie, is around 50 years old with glasses. He has the manner of a management executive but personable. He tended to drift into vague management speak at times to demonstrate concepts. He is clearly doing a very challenging job in circumstances in which his organisation’s structure closes off possibilities for real and quick improvement.

He pointed out past failings eg that it was not compulsory for Dioceses to follow national policy until 2015, no effective mechanism for punishment of clergy for failing to report until 2015 and couldn’t compel a risk assessment until 2016.

Before he joined there was 0.5 posts in national safeguarding. Now there are 13.5.

His work areas are :-

Policy, training, quality assurance and complex case work.

In addition to his team he has a “network of associates” ie work is outsourced such as the development of the safe spaces project and safeguarding hub website.

There were various conversations on technical issues, in many cases GT acknowledged the present position is not acceptable but he had plans in place to bring improvement such as monitoring PTOs, “structured conversations” arising from SCIE audits, information sharing and the safeguarding hub website, training backlog, and psychological profiling.

The employment of DSAs at a national level to ensure independence is not ruled out by GT.

DSAs improvements are :-

  • Now need a Social Work qualification
  • DSAs can overrule Bishops on safeguarding
  • They can’t be clergy
  • They need management experience

GT was unable to adequately respond to the criticism that the give “due regard” to church safeguarding regulations wording was insufficiently imperative. He simply said there are other areas of the guidance which have a “must” wording.

GT was sadly equally woolly on mandatory reporting choosing excuses on thresholds for safeguarding over commitment to the principle.

He acknowledged there was more work to do on whistleblowing, cathedrals, working with survivors, ISVAs, data collection and the safe spaces project.

He managed to avoid a good question from Alexis Jay on whether he had found a diocese failing to report a safeguarding mater in to him centrally.

Ivor Frank describes GT’s flaccid language about future plans and underscores the need for urgency in pushing them through.

Edina Carmi

Edina Carmi (ED) is a very experienced social worker who prepared the report on failings of the Chichester Cathedral Dean and Chapter arising from the Terence Banks abuse conviction in 2000. She is a middle aged woman with short fair hair and is a very good communicator.

She found Dean John Treadgold to be resistant to allowing her access to employees and volunteers at the Cathedral. He felt there would be reputational damage, it would stir up more complaints and would damage their finances.

The main problem was that Bishop John Hind, the Diocesan Bishop was powerless to force the Cathedral to implement her recommendations.

Overall she found a divergence starting at the end of the 1970s between acceptable safeguarding practice and the Cathedral practices. Overall the Cathedral wanted to deal with everything “in house”.

ED is also the lead on the SCIE audits taking place at present. She acknowledges the shortcomings of the SCIE audit being paper only but feels it will give a baseline of how the church is complying with its own guidance.

ED’s thoughts on the future ?

She identifies that many in the church think they have literally “God-given” power. She questions whether it is possible to change the culture unless the church is de-constructed and re-constructed with in-built checks and balances.

She also identified there is a need for a more targeted spread of funding between dioceses to meet the needs of the particular diocese. She also worries for DSAs as they are appointed by Bishops and it would take a particularly strong DSA to challenge a Bishop. She advocates DSAs being recruited and employed nationally but operating locally. She also advocates an independent scheme for redress and decisions on cases.


A11 was a chorister at a choral school. He was befriended by Terence Banks, his parents were proud of him and were taken in by Banks who persuaded them to let A11 stay overnight with him. During the overnight stay he was sexually assaulted at age around 11 by Banks. Banks worked at the BBC in London and took A11 to his flat in London where he again sexually assaulted him. A further incident when he was 13 happened when an adult member of a choir took him to a flat in Richmond and sexually assaulted him. A11 told him Mum but she didn’t believe him. There was another more minor incident of over clothing touching by a teacher.

A11 reported all this to the police in 2000 and was treated well by the police. He had to fund his own counselling and suffered with mental health difficulties, preventing him working for an extended period. He criticised the cathedral’s provision of support for Banks but none for him.

A11 was never given a copy of the Carmi report despite being one of the complainants.

He has felt very strongly that the church has handled him very badly. He was invested very heavily in the church being a boarder at a chorister’s school and the behaviour of these men and the Cathedral afterwards has shattered his faith. He described the rottenness of the men and the complete absence of any kind of good response.

He criticised the use of a psychiatrist who did a desktop report without seeing him which led to an offer of compensation being withdrawn.

The second abuser described is by the way still working at the Cathedral.

Dean Peter Atkinson

Dean Peter Atkinson (PA) is the present Dean at Chichester Cathedral. He wore a grey suit with a dog collar, was very considered with his words and vague at times.

He described the arrest of Banks as a wake up call and found it shocking. He also mentioned the conviction of Michael Walsh who was imprisoned for 5 years for indecent assaults on girls. He admitted the chapter’s mistake in allowing Walsh back into the Cathedral – he racalls the discussion being about forgiveness and whether he was entitled to a fresh start after prison.

He admits John Treadgold handles the Banks disclosure and parents badly.

PA said “I can see John Treadgold would have been defensive with the police. At the time of his retirement he burned a number of files. He had left the Deanery and returned, removed files from the basement and had a bonfire in the garden. I don’t know what the files were. They might have been Chapter files but could have been his own. We found it odd and told the police.”

PA resisted the suggestion that the Cathedral was a closed community.

He regrets putting together an indignant document criticising the Carmi report.

Elizabeth Hall

Elizabeth Hall (EH) was the national safeguarding adviser (NSA) 2009-2013. In her 50s, she wore glasses and had collar length hair.

EH has worked in many posts throughout her career before taking the role of NSA which was 2 days a week.

She felt handicapped by a lack of funding, no national guidance on interrelation of dioceses to the centre, and feeling “outside the church house family”.

She describes her work supporting DSAs and the KATE Wood discovery of the Tyler report in April 2012. She felt the cover up of Ball had been managed and Sussex Police should be told.

She thinks :-

  • This can happen anywhere (not just Chichester).
  • People can abuse in plain sight
  • These men are obsessed with creating safe places for them to abuse and take care to carve out spaces.

In questioning Ivor Frank asked about document ACE006654_002 which relates to the Bishop of Peterborough having a massive bonfire of documents when he retired. She said there is a theological underpinning to this – to give his successor a fresh start. She is also aware that people keep documents in their attics after retirement.

Archbishop Justin Welby

Justin Welby (JW) wore round spectacles, was clean shaven and had short grey hair and wore a grey suit, black shirt and a dog collar and cross.

His aims on safeguarding are to:-

  1. Use his influence
  2. Provide leadership
  3. Make resources available
  4. Use discipline

He acknowledged he can’t compel any Bishop to do anything. His only tool is visitations which are cumbersome and rare. He complained the church took a long time to change things and that causes frustration. He wants to eradicate a culture of deference to bishops by working as teams, he hopes to pick up bad management before it becomes catastrophic. He’d advocate psychometric testing if its proven to help. He commented on integrating “tribes” and feels the Oxbridge class bias at the top is breaking down.

On the issues of forgiveness he used biblical quotes and theology to explain what the church should do.

On the issue of an independent redress system he said “we need justice therefore if we can’t find it in the present system we need to find a better one”

On the Bishop George Bell case he stressed the need for transparency and his principled avoidance of non disclosure agreements.

He agrees data collection is not good enough, that DSAs need outside supervision and nore ASVAs are needed. He also agreed the CDM process needs a separate strand for child abuse cases.

He learned that he’s become ashamed of the church, the insanity of a deferential culture, that Parish safeguarding officers are the front line, and the church has got to find ways of implementing change more quickly.

Bishop Peter Hancock

Peter Hancock, a fair haired man of around 60 wore a grey suit, purple shirt, dog collar and cross. He spoke with excitement about safeguarding.

He agreed the man in the street won’t know what giving “due regard” means legally and thinks there should be a change to clarify this.

He agreed there should be a separate procedure on capability in the CDM.

He agreed DSAs should be recruited nationally and work locally.

Discussions are starting on a redress scheme.

He agrees the seal of the confessional should not apply to child abuse.

He is working on improvements to monitoring PTOs including a register with Crockfords.

He refused to agree the church should implement Mandatory Reporting, instead stating it is the responsibility of everyone in the country to report. He feels the church is as close as it can get to MR.

He’s learnt its not enough to listen. The church needs to act and make policies visible and credible.

IICSA Chichester Inquiry Summary week 1 (5-9th March 2018)

IICSA Anglican Inquiry

Diocese of Chichester

Summary notes of David Greenwood

Monday 5th March 2018

Counsel to the Inquiry, Fiona Scolding QC, (“CTI”) opened by saying that a series of allegations were made of child sex abuse by clergy in the 1990s and that these escalated, engulfing the Diocese in the 2000s. She would be asking whether the responses to complainants were adequate, whether lessons had been learnt and changes implemented. She explained that some complainants lives had been blighted, some had become activists to compel the church to look at uncomfortable truths.

CTI explained that the Church of England is the Established Church of GB. It is important and powerful. It is seen as a leader of ethics but its management of abuse shows how badly things can go wrong.

She listed problems of a tendency to make children feel responsible for the abuse, a disbelief that clergy could harm children, failing to spot grooming behaviour, misguided loyalty, a culture of amateurism, patchy training and poor record keeping. She highlighted the emphasis on forgiveness, putting the church’s reputation before the welfare of children, internal fall outs getting in the way of good safeguarding practice, having a problem with women, being slow to change and being a collection of autonomous bodies. The church runs 4000 primary schools and 227 secondary schools, youth groups, scouts and Sunday schools. There are 12,000 parishes, 49 dioceses, 7,253 full time paid clergy, 3,000 part time or voluntary priests, 6,000 are retired but still have permission to officiate.

CTI explained the almost impenetrable structure of the church and the myriad of organisations. She explained that 2004 was the first time clergy had to have CRB checks and that until 2013 Bishops had no basis to suspend someone unless they are arrested by the police. Clergy could only be formally disciplines through the Clergy Discipline Measure in 2009 but can only be removed from office if imprisoned. 2016 brought powers to suspend if an allegation is made. Until recently no training was required to get Permission To Officiate (“PTO”).

Overview of events in Chichester

1997-2001 Janet Hind Diocesan Safeguarding Adviser (“DSA”). She was informed of abuse by Roy Cotton and Colin Pritchard in 1997. Police investigate but no action is their decision in 1999. Unhappy with the poor response, Philip Johnson (survivor) published a magazine to publicise his abuse in 2000. 2001 Terence Banks is convicted of abuse of choir boys at Chichester Cathedral. 2005-2010 a growing number of individuals make complaints. 2007 Shirley Hosgood starts work as the new DSA. 2008 Roger Meekings is commissioned to do the past Cases Review work. He produces an addendum dealing with the safeguarding failures he has identified. It proves controversial as Bishop Wallace Benn, is criticised and having lied about the extent of his knowledge of convictions of and allegations against Cotton. In an attempt to bring an end to any controversy Bishop John Hind commissions Elizabeth Butler Sloss to prepare a report. The problems identified lead to an Archbishop’s visitation and more criticism between 2011 and 2013. Wallace Benn retires in 2013. Richard Jackson replaces him. More information about failures concerning Bishop Peter Ball results in his arrest along with Vickery House. Moira Gibb reported in 2017 on the handling of the Peter Ball case and was highly critical of Former Archbishop George Carey.


Noel Moore

Convicted in the 1950s of child sex offences but allowed to be a priest (his conviction was no bar to the priesthood).

Roy Cotton

Convicted of Gross Indecency in 1954. Expelled from the scouts as a youth leader, opened a school and ordained by the Bishop of Portsmouth in the knowledge of the conviction. Cotton conspired to abuse children with Colin Pritchard, another Chichester priest. Cotton retired in 1999 but was granted a PTO. It is alleged that Wallace Benn and his Archdeacon Nicholas Reade knew about his conviction but despite a police investigation in 1997 failed to tell the police, went on to allow him PTO ignored another complainant in 2003 and lied about his knowledge to John hind, Philip Jones and Roger Meekings.

Colin Pritchard

Pleaded guilty in 2008 to some child sex offences. Found guilty of Indecent assault and conspiracy to commit indecent assault with Roy Cotton in 2018 and sentenced to 16 years imprisonment. He had been granted PTO in 2003 despite having been arrested for child sex offences.

Robert Coles

This priest retired in 1997 and despite having no PTO continued to take services and took over 100 in retirement. He had been taken on one arrest to the police station by Wallace Benn, a fact not declared in his file. He had to be prevented from going on a school trip abroad and eventually pleaded guilty to child sex offences in 2013.

Jonathan Graves

Worked closely with Robert Coles and convicted of offences in 2013. A suspicion of illegal activity but not suspended until a 2009 CRB revealed an offence.

Gordon Rideout

Convicted of 32 indecent assaults and 2 rapes in 2016. Acquitted in a court martial n 1972 and allowed to continue in ministry in Chichester. Wallace Benn had ben aware of allegations against him in 1998 but took no action. He even drove him to the police station to answer a further allegation in 2002 but failed to declare this. Wallace Benn even asked John Hind not to report a blemished CRB check in 2010.

Keith Wilkie Denford

Also convicted of abusing 2 boys in his choir.

Michael Myton

Also a choir master convicted

Christopher Howarth

Priest imprisoned for 16 years in 2016.

Peter Pannet

Pleaded guilty in 2012 to sharing indecent images – 32 months imprisonment.

Former Bishop Peter Ball

Accepted a caution in 1992 for offences against a 17 year old trainee monk. Protected at the time by a concerted campaign by establishment figures with evidence suppressed at Lambeth palace. He leaves his post as a House of Lords Bishop but continues to enjoy the hospitality and favours from the then Archbishop of Canterbury, George Carey. A file containing evidence of offending at Littlington whilst he was Bishop of Lewes is discovered and leads to his arrest and conviction in 2015.

Vickery House

Peter Ball’s right hand man in the “give a year to god scheme” convicted in 2015 of indecent assaults on boys.

Michael Walsh

Choirmaster, husband of an organist. Allegation of abuse and Janet Hind was overruled by Bishop Eric Kemp in the 1990s when she asked for him to be prevented from taking choirs.

Terence Banks

Choirmaster at Chichester Cathedral. Convicted of abusing choirboys in 2001 and sentenced to 16 years imprisonment.

Many more allegations have been the subject over the years of varying degrees of action from Bishops or DSAs.

Former Bishop George Bell

Alleged abuse late 1940s. George Bell died in 1958. Despite a letter of complaint having sat on file for an extended period a survivor “Carole” repeated her allegation in 2016. A core group was set up and compensation of £16,000 was paid. Controversy emerged and Lord Carlile wrote a report which criticised this church response. Another allegation has since been made.

The inquiry has read 200,000 pages of documents and has assessed 64 witness statements.

Core participant representatives were able to make opening statements. David Greenwood’s opening statement is published in the next blog.

The Bishop’s Council representative essentially argued for the status quo to continue.

Tuesday 6th March 2018



A survivor of abuse by Army Chaplain Gordon Rideout (who later worked as a priest in the Diocese of Chichester) explained how she had been abused by Rideout as a young girl. She explained how powerless she felt during a court martial process in 1972 in which Rideout had been acquitted. Rideout was later convicted in 2012 of offending against her and others.

Phil Johnson


Mr Johnson explained how he had been befriended by a priest, Roy Cotton in his home town, groomed by Cotton and taken away on trips and to Cotton’s house. Physical contact then sexual contact was initiated by Cotton who supported Mr Johnson through Grammar school. He was plied with alcohol regularly and taken to a party in Northamptonshire after which he was sexually assaulted by a friend of Cotton, Rev Colin Pritchard.

Mr Johnson described complaining to the Sussex police in 1996 but being poorly treated by Sussex police. Despite Cotton having a conviction for indecency with children in 1954 the police decided to take no action in 1999. Mr Johnson’s world fell apart in 1999 but he was determined to achieve justice so published a magazine article in 2000 explaining his story which was distributed in the parish area where Cotton had worked. This strategy worked as complainants came forward in 2002 and 2003. Despite being aware the Diocese staff failed to pass this information on to the police. This new corroboration would have caused the original allegations to be re-investigated.

Phil Johnson kept trying to raise work out why Cotton’s activities had not come to the attention of the Diocese officials before. He tried to meet with senior clergy but was rebuffed. In 2006 just by chance the Diocesan Safeguarding Adviser (‘DSA”), Tony Sellwood died in a car accident. His computer was recovered and the a letter from him to Phil Johnson was noticed by the caretaker DSA, Janet Hind. By this time Northampton Police were investigating Colin Pritchard for his activities in Northampton and the letter found its way to them. Northants police contacted Mr Johnson and this led to Pritchard pleading guilty to child sex offences in 2008. Despite this new information Mr Johnson discovered that the police file from the earlier Sussex investigation had been destroyed. Meanwhile Phil Johnson had corresponded with Bishop Wallace Benn, the Bishop of Lewes who had responsibility for Eastbourne where Cotton had been operating. Mr Johnson wanted to find out what Wallace Benn had known and when (as it may have led to a more positive outcome to the first police investigation). He managed to meet with Wallace Benn and Shirley Hosgood (the new DSA) in 2008 and at that meeting Benn told them that he had known about “something from Cotton’s past” at that time and told the meeting that he had “pushed him into retirement” in 1999. Wallace Benn’s account of what he found out and when is questionable as we shall see in later evidence to IICSA.

Around this time the church nationally was putting together a review of their safeguarding figures called “The past cases review”. A social worked called Roger Meekings put the figures together for Chichester and was in theory allowed access to all files (there are doubts about his access to some files and documents namely Peter Ball, Vickery House and Gordon Rideout files).

Mr Johnson raised the controversy about what Wallace Benn knew when with Roger Meekings and pushed for a review of the position on this and other cases which had been flagged up by Mr Johnson and Shirley Hosgood. Mr Meekings embarked on a further report. This report, now best known as “The Meekings Report” was critical of Wallace Benn, accusing him of knowing about Cotton and Pritchard much earlier but of failing to pass on his knowledge to either the DSA, his bishop or the police.

It seems Wallace Benn was so unhappy with the Meekings Report that he threatened libel proceedings and created a state of catatonia in the diocese. The Meekings Report was not published until much later. To try to break the impasse Baroness Butler Sloss was brought in to work out whether the Meekings Report was accurate (she concluded it was). Mr Johnson incidentally was suspicious about Baroness Butler Sloss as she was a supporter of the church and not independent. He worked out that two Bishops had lied to her and she had to correct her report as a result.

Mr Johnson talked about the Arch Episcopal visitation (essentially an inspection by the Archbishop’s staff). He was content with its findings (essentially that Chichester had become dysfunctional on safeguarding due to poor systems and disagreements at the top).

Mr Johnson feels DSAs should be completely independent, an independent system of providing counselling support should be introduced and paid for by the church, that a culture change will only come via legislation and criminal sanctions. Overall his life has been blighted but he has tried to turn his experience into positive change.

On one final note he reflected that he often thinks about the person he would have been if the abuse hadn’t shaped his life and missed opportunities.

Shirley Hosgood

Was the DSA between 2007 and 2010. She is a qualified social worker. It was a part time post and whilst she had support at the parish level she felt unsupported by the Bishops.

She describes arriving to find files very disorganised. There were 3 different types of files in 3 different locations.

She criticised a lack of a counselling protocol.

She had specific criticisms that Gordon Rideout’s Permission to Officiate (“PTO”) had not been suspended after he had been arrested in 2008. She discovered that Wallace Benn had driven him to a police station to be questioned in 2002 and yet had still not suspended his PTO in 2008.

Shirley was concerned there was an un-monitored covenant of care for Pritchard known about by Philip Jones, the Lewes Archdeacon, yet this wasn’t passed on to the police and could have affected his 2008 trial. A 2008 blog regarding Pritchard passed to her by Phil Johnson was not passed to the police.

She was concerned about when Wallace Benn had found out about Cotton’s conviction as no action had been taken to suspend or discipline him in the late 1990s during the police investigation. She was taken to a transcript of a covert recording of the 2008 meeting between herself, Wallace Benn and Phil Johnson. She felt it was clear Bishop Wallace Benn had known about Cotton’s conviction in 1999 and despite this he’s been given a PTO. She added that she tried to work with Philip Jones, the Lewes Archdeacon, but he failed to respond and didn’t give sufficient weight to her concerns.

She felt the Meekings report was positive and explored the facts adequately. She felt it should have been shared with survivors (even if it had been redacted).

On Gordon Rideout in 2010 a blemished CRB arrived. She recommended the withdrawal of his PTO immediately. Bishop John Hind asked the Diocesan Safeguarding Advisory Group to look at it again. She said in evidence “I was amazed at his response”. The DSAG did but unanimously decided his PTO should be immediately withdrawn.

She felt Bishop john Hind was initially good but that after the Meekings Report he prevented an open and honest discussion of the Report’s findings. She had no confidence that the bishops had learnt anything from the Meekings Report.

In relation to Bishop Wallace Benn Shirley hosgood had these observations :-

I felt it was not safe to appoint a youth worker and he said he was a personal friend and he tried to change my view. It was a difficult phone conversation.

The diocese had not learnt the lessons of the Cotton and Pritchard failures. PTOs were being given without looking at the blue files.

There were communication failings. Wallace Benn was very angry with her and this stifled communication.

Eventually Shirley Hosgood was denied access to a meeting at which 4 cases would be discussed between Wallace Benn, Philip Jones and the Diocesan Secretary, Clive Dilloway. Shirley was not invited. She did however write a letter to explain her view on each case. She felt so side-lined that she resigned.

The panel Chair, Alexis Jay asked whether senior clergy were aware of their duty to report to which Shirley Hosgood replied that they did, that senior clergy chose to ignore the requirement. She mentioned that one member of clergy told her he wouldn’t tell her about concerns as she’ll tell the police. No one checked to see how procedures were being implemented.

In questioning from panel member, Ivor Frank, Ms Hosgood confirmed that she ran all contacts with survivors past EIG, the insurers, first.

In questioning from panel member, Sir Malcolm Evans, Ms Hosgood confirmed that she knew the 1954 Cotton conviction was there in 2007 on his blue file but also that Wallace Benn knew about it in 2001 and she presumed it had come with him from the Diocese of Portsmouth in the late 1960s.

Wednesday 7th March 2018

Bishop John Hind

He confirmed he was the Diocesan Bishop of Chichester. He had 2 area Bishops. He failed to supervise their activities and allowed them almost a free reign in their parts of the diocese (Lewes and Horsham).

He confirmed he would not break the seal of the confessional even for child abuse cases.

He refused to take responsibility for action or inaction in the area of Wallace Benn (Lewes).

He now wishes he’d given DSAs unfettered access to the blue files much earlier (they only got access in 2008).

He explained how in 2001 with the Data Protection Act coming into force he organised staff to take “ephemora” out of blue files. He did some of the document removal himself. He referred to guidance from Lambeth Palace. He agreed he did not closely supervise this and that some records of a safeguarding nature may have been destroyed. He said “ It is possible that child protection matters could have been removed. We didn’t have trained staff”.

There had been an internal inquiry into what went wrong at the Chichester Cathedral written by Edina Carmi. It was not published as reports were not published back then. He and Shirley Hosgood had no jurisdiction to look into the Cathedral.

He recalled the conflict which arose between Roger Meekings and Wallace Benn and also Shirley Hosgood. Wallace Benn threatened to sue him. The Butler Sloss report was intended to break the impasse but failed.

He remarked that no children were harmed as a result of the internal struggle but it got in the way of good responses to survivors.

John Hind eventually delegated responsibility for safeguarding to Archdeacon Philip Jones and the implementation of the Meekings recommendations was done piecemeal.

He agreed with 4 of the 5 findings of Butler Sloss :-

  1. There was a lack of understanding about child abuse and its seriousness in the Diocese (agreed).
  2. The Diocese was slow to recognise the importance of DSAs even though one had been in post since 1997 (not agreed).
  3. There were failures by Bishops to communicate important information to DSAs (agreed).
  4. There was no access to blue files by DSAs until 2004 and then only open access after 2008 (agreed).
  5. There was a failure to respond well to victims (agreed).

On Gordon Rideout Bishop John Hind knew of his 1972 court martial and that Wallace Benn had driven him to the police station yet despite this he wrote to Rideout when he was arrested in 2008 “It goes without saying that you have my full confidence and I hope so mush everything will soon be resolved”.

Why did he write this ? “I thought the matter was closed when the police took no action”.

Rideout went on to be appointed an acting Archdeacon. Things then got much worse as a blemished CRB check was received. Wallace Benn asked john Hind not to disclose it to Shirley Hosgood as Rideout was a friend. John hind refused to hold it back.

John Hind eventually agreed that “there was some sort of collusion and conspiracy taking place among abusing clergy in the East (Lewes). It was clear people were working in concert”.

John Hind advocated a more systematic approach and independence of safeguarding from institutional structures.

Archdeacon Philip Jones

He was a trouble shooter for the Bishop of Chichester.

He was critical of the lack of independence of Roger Meekings as he had been Shirley Hosgood’s supervisor. Jones felt he was an intermediary between Wallace Benn and Shirley Hosgood. The impasse affected the diocese’s response to survivors. Wallace Benn’s threat of legal proceedings.

There came a point at which he became aware that Wallace Benn had misled him about when he knew about Cotton’s 1954 conviction. Wallace Benn had told him he knew only in 2003 but it emerged he had known during the currency of the earlier police investigation. Philip Jones felt this was unedifying, he personally was embarrassed and realised Shirley Hosgood had not been treated well.

There was discussion about a lack of proper checks on Cotton’s PTO. He was said to have been spoken to by Nichols Reade about restrictions on his PTO but there was in fact no trace of a PTO and it emerged that conditions cannot be placed on PTO.

Philip Jones feels Wallace Benn is a believer that wrongdoers can get forgiveness even on safeguarding matters. This went to the extent that in the eyes of God the event hadn’t happened.

Ivor Frank pressed Philip Jones on the standards of proof he used to decide issues of safeguarding and pointed to a document in which Jones (ACE022267_375-8) in which Mr Jones said there was a need for absolute certainty (which as a lawyer he knew was a very high standard).

Thursday 9th March 2018

Alana Lawrence


Former MACSAS chair. MACSAS is the support organisation which supports survivors of clergy abuse (Christian churches). It advocates on survivors behalf, supports and signposts them. It runs a helpline which has 400+ calls per year and 500+ e mail contacts. These have increased over the last 5 years.

She and MACSAS were shocked in 2009 with the past cases review which under-reported the scale of clergy abuse.

Alana tried to help on the group which was putting together guidance for the church but left as she was being sidelined in 2010. She criticises the 2011 “Repsponding Well” document for being a pastoral support document only.

She participated in the Stop Church Child Abuse campaign after the pope’s visit.

She felt motivated to respond to the Past Cases Review by putting together MACSAS’s own study from real cases “The Stones Cry Out”.

Alana helped Elizabeth Butler Sloss write her recommendations.

There came a series of meetings with the C of E head of safeguarding, Paul Butler, to try to improve the church’s systems. This resulted in opening up places on the National Safeguarding Panel for Phil Johnson and Jo Kind and the Safe Spaces project and MACSAS tried to make safe spaces independent of the church but the church wanted to control it and keep it in house.

Her recommendations are :-

  1. Mandatory reporting
  2. Guidance won’t work as good people do wrong things not only abuse but failing to report it.
  3. Independent support to be provided (therapy etc)
  4. Balance of probabilities should be the test.
  5. Mandatory risk assessments for all reports.
  6. Mandatory suspensions.
  7. Abolish the seal of the confessional.
  8. Stricter reports to Disclosure and Barring Service
  9. Where convicted abusers should be permanently removed.
  10. All records must be kept.
  11. Parish safeguarding officers should be told of those with conviction so they can monitor at parish level.
  12. There should be a national safeguarding monitoring system which is independent of the church.
  13. There should be national guidance on conduct, investigating and managing allegations. NB 75% of cases are non-recent.
  14. An independent body to award compensation in cases where there has been an allegation but no court determination.

Roger Meekings

Mr Meekings was initially asked to collate the information for the national past cases review but went on to review files due to concerns of Bishop John Hind that issues had arisen in safeguarding.

He had access to files. He thought he was being given access to all files. It transpires that some files and parts of files were withheld.

He found there was no consistency with files, few CRB checks, a policy of not keeping CRB checks on file, files had been inconsistently filetted (some papers taken out).

For instance the Pater ball file he saw at the time was much thinner than the 440 page file produced to the inquiry. Robert Coles had admitted an assault on a young boy but Mr Meekings didn’t see any record of this. On Rideout there was no information about the 2002 arrest despite Wallace Benn having driven him to the police station. Vickery House was simply not named by Bishop John hind as being a person of interest.

On the issue of Wallace Benn’s knowledge of Cotton’s conviction he spoke to Bishop Wallace and prepared a chronology of what he knew and when he knew it. This included entries to cover being aware of the conviction in 1998. Bishop Wallace agreed the chronology (ACE022270_12). He had concluded that Cotton told Nicholas Reade in 1998. Reade told Wallace Benn in 1998. Cotton told Wallace Benn in 1999.If the police had been told at the time it might have changed the course of the investigation.

Later Bishop Wallace disagreed with the report and threatened to sue for libel.

Roger Meekings reccomendations are :-

  1. End the Church’s exemption from the Equalities Act.
  2. Implement an independent safeguarding body.
  3. A national database of allegations.
  4. Clergy Discipline Measure requires a complete overhaul.

Ian Gibson

Worked as Bishop’s Chaplain in 2004. He was responsible for filing.

  1. Found files in disarray.
  2. PTOs were being granted without blue files being checked
  3. 90% of people didn’t have a CRB check.
  4. Found in a separate cabinet a file for Peter Ball
  5. He was present when Wallace Benn asked John Hind to hold back the blemished Rideout CRB.
  6. Bishop Wallace called Ian Gibson a liar and denied the incident.

Friday 10th March 2018


Angela Sibson

Was the diocesan Secretary. Started Feb 2011. Communicating well can built confidence but lack of clarity can reduce confidence.

The diocese didn’t pay Wallace Benn’s bill for legal advice.

The structure of the organisations in the diocese meant it was hard to work out who was accountable in Charity Commission terms.

This witness came across as unconvincing in her attempts to defend the organisation.

Janet Hind

She was a social worker. After social work she worker half time for the diocese of Chichester and half time for the Diocese of Guilford. She withdrew from the Chichester role when her husband became the Bishop of Chichester.

She was undoubtedly sincere in her evidence and her efforts and admitted making mistakes or some safeguarding matters.

She drew up a safeguarding policy in 1996.

Mrs Hind was overruled on the issue of Michael Walsh in the 1990s and produced her note of the case.

On Robert Coles he had admitted abuse to Nicholas Reade (Archdeacon) who told Mrs Hind. She admits she should have told the police but didn’t. She assumed someone else would have told the police.

It is worth noting that her own 1996 protocols require the DSA to report to the police.

She became the National Safeguarding Adviser orking 2.5 days per week.

She recommends :-

  1. Arbitration on an appeal process is survivors are unhappy with processes.
  2. General child protection should be done within dioceses.
  3. The balance of probabilities test should be used.
  4. A culture of informed vigilance needs to be developed with parents and congregations.

Edmund Hick

He is the former police officer in charge of the police child protection investigations in Sussex.

He agreed the first investigation into Cotton was very slow.He agreed the police destroyed the file in around 2005/6 because it had been categorised as an offence against an adult (Philip Johnson) rather than against a child.

He agreed that if he had known of the conviction of Cotton during the first investigation its complexion may have been different. He said it was routine to get pre-cons on arrest.

He added that if he had known about the 2003 complainant the file would have been re-opened.

The Diocese seemed to resent statutory agencies and the police and other safeguarders had to drag them into the 21st Century. It has been hard at times.

He later worked on the Diocesan Safeguarding Advisory Group which was disbanded (he suspected he and others on the group were being a nuisance).

Resumes on Monday 12th March 2018

New book on church responses to child sex abuse allegations – Responding Badly by David Greenwood

Click here to see the book cover

All royalties from this book go to the support organisation which helps support and signpost survivors of clergy sex abuse, MACSAS (Minister and Clergy Sexual Abuse Survivors).

Click here for the link to Responding Badly on Amazon

Numerous isolated examinations of particular clergy child sex abuse cases have been published but this book digs deeper than the narrative and explores the cultures of churches, their internal dynamics and self-protection mechanisms. It isolates failings and suggests positive and achievable solutions ahead of the Independent inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (“IICSA”). This book looks at the issue from an institutional perspective as opposed to the individual case. For the last two decades we have seen countless clergy abuse scandals covered in the news. Year after year there have been clergy in both the Anglican and Roman Catholic churches prosecuted. Suspected cover-ups have been exposed. Case reviews have taken place yet the UK Government has allowed the churches to continue to govern themselves on safeguarding issues. This book opens up publicly:- • the scale of the problem, • the cost to individuals and society of child sexual abuse (“CSA”), • the obstructive attitude of both churches, • the internal culture of the churches, • the dynamics of power relationships in churches, • The legal and psychological barriers against reporting, • Case studies of cover ups in both churches, • The failures of our criminal and civil justice systems with solutions, • Plans for reform and independent resolution of CSA reports, The state has repeatedly failed to intervene and has allowed religious organisations to police themselves with dire consequences. This has led abusers to feel relatively safe to commit sex crime without being brought to account. Organisations have put their good name before the protection of children. Abusing clergy have been moved between parishes, dioceses, and countries when discovered. The book sets out to demonstrate the effects of abuse, how they have festered and what is needed for the future. The Roman Catholic Church and the Church of England are singled out although the power relationships and lack of effective responses apply to almost any institution from which vulnerable individuals from time to time seek help. Decision makers in schools, other religions, social services, caring professions, young offender institutions, and youth movements should look with introspection for parallel bad practice in their organisations. This book sets out some of the issues to be examined by the Inquiry in digestible detail. The book concludes that an entirely independent body should be established to receive and deal with all institutional allegations of CSA, providing uniformity of approach and establishing trust with disaffected survivors. This conclusion and references throughout to the proposed approach being suitable for schools, detention centres, children’s homes and youth groups, broadens the appeal of the book to institutions responsible for children’s’ welfare. Clergy in both churches and those with interest institutions to be examined in the IICSA are likely to be readers. Survivors of Clergy abuse will read with interest.